Obama’s Cairo, then and now

President Obama’s “new beginning” address delivered in Cairo four years ago was filled with the high-minded platitudes that have become a hallmark of his speech making. He stood before the audience at Cairo University as the exponent of progress, peace, and cooperation. No surprise here. He made clear his opposition to “violent extremism in all of its forms.” Again no surprise. He worked his way through the list of other Washington preoccupations: stopping nuclear proliferation, cleaning up failed interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and managing the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The passage of time has done nothing to make this address seem either fresh or illuminating.

What does stand out in retrospect is the president’s silence on the role that the United States has played as supporter of secular autocrats in the region over the last half century, often stepping in where the British or French had earlier taken control and then faltered. Far from focusing on the U.S. entanglement in the region as a source of conflict, Obama pointed instead to a set of grand abstractions — centuries-old tension between the West and Islam, colonialism, and globalization. His United States was a benevolent bystander while other powers and other forces made history and created the tensions now coursing through the Middle East.

Perhaps the most telling part of the 2009 Cairo address came when Obama chided those who have misperceived the U.S. in terms of “the crude stereotype of a self-interested empire.” Is it really possible he does not understand the degree to which the U.S. has been guided by self interest? Surely his aides can tell him what any textbook makes abundantly clear: that U.S. policy was long shaped by Israel, oil, and containment. Today Israel and oil persist with the terrorist threat substituting for the old communist menace.

Equally striking is Obama’s inability to see that the sustained U.S. attempt to shape the region follows closely the pattern of imperial intervention by other powers, with the tools much the same whether diplomatic pressure, the creation and support of clients, the reward of aid packages and trade deals, and the training of friendly militaries. The “crude stereotype” may be not be so crude. Indeed, like some stereotypes it may have a considerable element of truth about it.

What this speech says today — in the wake of the military coup against an elected government in Cairo — is that the change president is mostly about policy continuity. Washington’s support for autocrats is an old story. Reliance on strongmen, especially military strongmen, was a pronounced feature of the global Cold War. The Cold War, far from an aberration, built on a pattern that had become well established earlier in the century. Elected governments, Washington feared, might be swayed by popular passions or betrayed by their own immaturity. Coups whether in Iran in 1953 or in Egypt in 2013 paved the way for strongmen promising stability and accommodating U.S. interests. Alas, the clients often are less responsive than we would like. There is a long record of the tail wagging the dog. But the national security establishment has recognized that some local waywardness is part of the price of any collaborative relationship.

However anguished the Obama administration may be, it is not rudderless. It is following the course long ago marked out by an intrusive and regionally disruptive policy of “strategic realism.” Egypt is important not because it is (as that mystifying phrase has it) “a bedrock of peace” but because it blocks an Islamist party that was feeling its oats and because it guarantees easy access for U.S. armed forces so active in the region over the last two decades. Putting up with state repression is the price to pay for advancing self interest.

There is a larger price for pursuing this course. It confirms not just in the Middle East but worldwide the “crude stereotype” that Obama decried. The United States continues to prop up friendly, secular authoritarians and thus continues to feed popular antipathy and suspicion that in turn inspires the resistance we call terrorism.

This course also leaves American policy locked in a long standing contradiction, professing high minded principles, above all support for democracy, while in practice giving priority to national self interest. So even as we deepen alienation abroad, we compound our own confusion about what what we really want from this part of the world.

The Obama administration may yet decide to call a coup a coup and quit propping up the Egyptian military — and with good reason. The U.S. project in the Middle East has lost its mojo. Domestic tolerance has dwindled while the U.S. tools to shape the region are not working. But the difficulty Washington is having turning in a fresh direction is testimony to the claims of self interest and the constraints and confusion spawned by a now troubled half-century campaign of regional intervention.

Obama and Syria: Trapped in a web of words

Language is potent, a truth confirmed by President Obama’s recent, reluctant decision to escalate the U.S. intervention in the Syrian civil war. The President has given every sign of wanting to give priority to “nation building at home.” Important to popular welfare, this course is arguably also indispensable to shoring up the sagging foundation on which U.S. global influence rests. An electorate pinched economically and a federal government living beyond its means is going to impose international constraints. Obama is right to consider popular discontent and national insolvency big deals that deserve urgent attention.

Despite this carefully calculated commitment to national recuperation and international restraint, Obama has fallen prey to the old familiar axioms with their continuing power to shape thinking in Washington and the terms of policy debate. Read the arguments of the interventionists determined to see the Assad regime ousted. They speak of “resolve” that U.S. leaders have to demonstrate to a watching world. They point to a “responsibility” that the United States has to live up to. They invoke “interests” that demand protection. They talk of “credibility” at stake.

Each of these vaporous notion is advanced with great certitude. Each draws its strength from a foreign policy discourse that has over some seven decades served as the natural language of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Free of any detailed demonstration of the truths they encapsulate, these magic words depend on notions ingrained in the nationalist imagination to carry the day. Precisely because of its ritualistic quality and its association with nationalist and policy orthodoxy, the appeal to resolve, responsibility, interest, and credibility do not invite discussion or scrutiny. The mere pronouncement suffices. Thanks to this gossamer stuff, those clamoring for more decisive U.S. action in Syria have entangled Obama.

Yet the world in which this vocabulary gained currency has changed. This is the point that critics of deeper involvement in the Syrian crisis have made in a variety of ways. The Middle East which the interventionists with their heads filled with old truisms seek to manage is in the grip of new regional sentiments and under the sway of rising regional powers. No less important, the shape of the international community has changed with the rise of new powers impatient with U.S. dictation and uncomprehending in the face of ritual language coming out of Washington. Finally, the domestic world in which old catchwords are supposed to mobilize support is more recalcitrant. A U.S. population polarized and pinched has problems enough at home. Any attempt to decisively sway the outcome of the fighting in Syria would deepen the disarray.

Language is in its potency a trap — in this case an inducement to action even when careful consideration warns of potentially dire consequences. Put differently, the axioms handed down from earlier policy practice have demonstrated their capacity to overrule prudent calculation.

That insight leaves us with a set of genuine questions:

  • Do proponents of intervention not recognize a world transformed — or do they see changes but think they can ignore or reverse them? Do they really think the imagined glory days of the World War II and the Cold War when the magical words became orthodoxy can really be restored?
  • How long do the consequences of costly and even counterproductive decisions have to pile up before the justificatory language is discredited? Or does the accumulating damage to U.S. standing and material conditions make the comforting familiarity of the old language even more attractive?

These questions by their very nature suggest the United States is in the throes of transition, and the answers, if only we knew them, would tell us how long and difficult that transition will be.

Obama and the war on terror: toward greater realism

I’ve been a regular consumer of Barack Obama’s public statements, looking for a window into his mind. To be sure, it’s a risky business. Speech writers always to some degree get in the way, and the statements themselves can be more responses to political exigencies than expressions of faith. But those statements are by default some of the best evidence we have on the president’s perspective. (We don’t get fairly full declassification of pertinent records until some three or four decades after the event.) Moreover, my experience over the years suggests that presidential speeches often line up reasonably well with internal discussions as revealed in later declassified documents.

I confess approaching with low expectations what was advertised as a speech on the controversial drone strikes. Most of Obama’s speeches on international issues have struck me as stale and vacuous, reflecting none of the subtlety and insight that he has shown himself occasionally capable in other areas of public concern.

Reading the address delivered yesterday (23 May) at the National Defense University surprised me not just because it went well beyond the drone issue to address the conduct of the war on terror. More than that, Obama took some significant steps toward dealing with the war in terms of classical realism.

Responding to one realist proposition, Obama sought to carefully balance cost and benefit. The costs included notably the sacrifices made by members of the armed services and a massive diversion of material resources badly needed at home. Having rejected out of hand an open-ended prosecution of the war, he suggested that the lives, money, and effort invested so far had achieved significant results but had reached the point of diminishing value. Time to rebalance the commitment.

Responding to a second realist notion, Obama raised the relationship between ends and means — between U.S. goals and the methods used to realize those goals. The struggle to defend the homeland could undermine and distort vaunted American values. Practices such as detention, surveillance, and summary execution of citizens collided with ultimate U.S. goals. Similarly, while drones no less than special forces operations were attractive ways of striking at this particular enemy, the effect on the policies of states in the region and on public opinion could damage U.S. standing and prolong rather than shorten the conflict.

Alas, Obama’s realism has badly failed him on one major, difficult point — the very nature of the conflict that Americans call the war on terror. What a realist examination might suggest is, first of all, the current conflict that Obama along with most Americans conventionally imagine beginning on 9/11 is rooted in a long history of U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Any modern history of the region will trace in detail the pervasive pattern of U.S. intervention not to mention the resulting opposition. Read the words of Qutb and Khomeini onward to bin Laden on the close connection between U.S. actions and the resentment that has in turn bred resistance.

That resentment persists fed by continued U.S. meddling in all sorts of ways in countries across the region. Obama’s leaves no doubt that the meddling must continue. The region has to work out its destiny not on its own terms but with U.S. guidance ranging from diplomacy to political, social, and cultural development and under the shadow of a extensively deployed U.S. armed forces. “Moderates” in particular need backing against “extremist elements” and “violent extremists” in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria, while Washington should help “modernize economies, upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship” in an echo of the old and troubled faith in nation building.

Obama, who may think his war is winding down, has failed as as realist in another way. He does not take the perspective and intentions of the enemy seriously. It may be comforting but not smart to write off the other side as a collection of deranged minds delighting in terror. This dismissive view does not alter the fact that the foe has resorted to resistance that military jargon describes as asymetrical and that social sciences label as “the weapons of the weak.” Fighting the United States conventionally is a lost cause (ask Saddam Hussein), but random violence visited on the enemy population can be hard to counter.

Nor does stereotyping supply a good sense of the enemy’s commitment. The determination and sense of righteousness that matters in this war has come from various politicized forms of Islam. They have helped to inspire the dedication, solidarity, and sacrifice indispensable to sustained confrontation. Obama’s speech works hard to keep this insight at bay. It issues the usual denials that the Americans are at war with Islam and makes the predictable distinction between good Muslims who reject an ideology of violence and those led astray by the mistaken conviction “that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West.” Those on the wrong side of this imagined divide are hostile not because they have reason but becaucse they are the product of “deep rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred.”

Obama the realist can get only so far before lapsing into familiar clichés. Perhaps his imagination has constrained him or the politically loaded popular images of the enemy have intimidated him. Nonetheless he deserves credit for making significant progress toward a policy couched in more sensible terms. Let’s hope in time he and other policymakers will move toward a more realistic public assessment of the other side of the “global war on terror.” The first step might be to find another name for this conflict.

The Iraq War: Learning lessons, ignoring history

Talk about a gap between serious academic history and the policy community. The New York Times, which has made a big deal of the tenth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, offers a stunning case in point. At least five different items in the paper for Wednesday, 20 March, seek some perspective from “authorities” heavy tilted toward policy specialists and former Bush administration officials. There is nary a historian of any sort to be seen.

The paper’s editorial on the anniversary advances several startling propositions suggested by the U.S. experience in Iraq. These include getting our intelligence right, approaching decisions for war with an open mind. and understanding our regional influence is limited. Of course, nothing about how the press should guard against get rolled by the White House in the run up to war!

One of the David Petraeus acolytes, John Nagl, offers an op-ed that adds an additional deep insight: war holds surprises so military leaders need to be flexible. Unfortunately nothing more profound can be expected from a counter-insurgency camp whose use of history over the years has been at best tendentious.

David Sanger’s report on the lack of consensus on lessons learned features extensive quotes from ex-Bush officials offering predictable justifications. Sanger clearly has no historians in his Rolodex so what he reports comes from the echo chamber that is the policy world.

Five experts jump into a debate over whether removing Saddam Hussein was a good idea. No card-carrying historians of Iraq, the Middle, or U.S. foreign policy in this mix.

Perhaps the most revealing piece is Peter Baker’s treatment of Washington’s relative silence on the anniversary. He notes that the capital like the country more generally “seems happy to wash its hands of Iraq.” The real lesson learned, his piece suggests, is to forget wars that don’t go well. Just celebrate the ones you win. Forgetting may already be a sturdy feature of the American way of war. Silence followed the aftermath of the conquest of the Philippines, the frustrating war in Korea, and the Vietnam War (at least for a decade).

Anyone in the lesson business who wants to ignore history does so at their own peril. As any historian worth their salt will tell you, assessing a war just ten years gone is very difficult. Not enough time has passed for dispassionate perspective; partisanship and wishful thinking are still strong (a point that Times inadvertently drives home). Moreover, the evidence on which any compelling judgment depends is thin; it will take years for the historical record to become full enough to tell us with confidence who did what to whom and why.

But along with these cautions historians would make an additional point. The past is always helpful in setting context, and it is indispensable in cases so close to the present and so poorly documented as Iraq is. How did U.S. involvement in the region help set the stage for the Iraq imbroglio? Were there long-term forces or preoccupations in play that may have helped drive U.S. policymakers toward their decisions? What other wars offer parallels with Iraq that might be revealing? What long-term developments internationally and at home might have facilitated or obstructed the march to war?

Historians pursuing these kinds of questions can shed badly needed light on important issues otherwise for the moment necessarily obscure. Perhaps here’s the issue the Times staff might have explored: how can history serve as a resource to help us understand Iraq and our role in the world more generally?

Nationalism and the debate over U.S. hegemony

[The following is my contribution to a symposium on the end of the American century that appears in the most recent issue of the RSA Journal (Revista di Studi Americani) published by the Italian Association of North American Studies. I am grateful to the editors for permission to post my essay here.]


I devoted the Conclusion of The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (University of North Carolina Press, 2007) to the issue of hegemony. Returning to the topic today, I find that the fate of U.S. hegemony has become a hot topic that evokes both pessimistic and optimistic appraisals.

Historians and political scientists with a historical bent have gravitated toward the view that U.S. hegemony is in deep trouble. David S. Mason’s The End of the American Century (2009) is a good case in point. Mason surveys the erosion of American dominance in compelling domestic and international detail. His conclusion: “At a minimum, the United States will suffer decline in wealth, standard of living, and global influence” (215). Others convinced of the weakness of the U.S. position emphasize that dominance even at its zenith in the post-World War II years was limited and from the 1970s was badly battered. (Good recent summations of this perspective can be found in the Andrew Bacevich and Walter LaFeber contributions to The Short American Century: A Postmortem [2012], edited by Bacevich.)

Those pessimistic about long-term U.S. prospects can point to the doleful conclusion of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the broadly damaging 2008 economic crisis, the frustrating resistance on the part of regional powers (from Iran and Russia to China and North Korea), and the prolonged and ineffectual hand-wringing over fiscal affairs.

Despite this evidence for U.S. decline, some observers cling to optimism. Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the United States Is Not Destined to Decline (2012), embodies that tendency in spades. Lieber makes the slide in U.S. influence a recent development, dating it from the 1990s, and he minimizes the ground the U.S. has lost since the triumph over the Soviet Union. Invoking familiar neo-conservative themes, Lieber contends that lost ground can be recovered through social and ideological mobilization at home. By restoring something akin to the old Cold War outlook, Americans will regain the confidence and policymakers the capacity critical to the continuation of global leadership. Thus can the United States live up to its special mission in the world and serve as the indispensable guarantor of international order, security, and liberal values.

International relations realists seem to maintain a guarded optimism about U.S. prospects grounded in a conviction that policymakers in Washington can preserve U.S. dominance if they correctly read and adjust to the current configuration of interstate power, the rise of new non-state actors, and the challenge of acute trans-national problems. Steven Weber and Bruce W. Jentleson in The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas (2010), for example, think a salvage operation possible. U.S. leaders have only to bring their policy in line with the world as it is today rather than with a world nostalgically remembered. To take another example, G. John Ikenberry’s Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (2011) contends that the liberal global order that the U.S. put in place is still basically intact and amenable to U.S. leadership. This realist tendency to make continued U.S. influence dependent on reading international developments aright is also evident in the U.S. government’s recent forecast, the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (2012).

In reviewing these divergent pessimistic and optimistic approaches, I am struck by the absence of attention to U.S. nationalism as an element in the decline equation. The Tea Party revolt and the seemingly eternal presidential election campaign have provided forceful reminders of how badly frayed the national consensus has become and how important national consensus is as the basis for politics and policymaking. Nationalism’s conceptual utility is precisely its capacity to get us to reflect on what collective views Americans have embraced and how those views with both domestic and international ramifications have changed.

Bringing nationalism into the picture is strikingly easy to do. The ground has been prepared by a large, sophisticated collection of theoretical writings going back to the 1980s, and on that ground has arisen a considerable body of historical scholarship on various facets and phases of U.S. nationalism. This rich literature can help us think about the currently troubled U.S. position in three basic ways:

–First, U.S. nationalism is important today as earlier because it provides indispensable framing for policymakers by addressing the three preoccupations central to most nationalisms. It tells us who qualifies as a full citizen and thus has a genuine voice in national affairs, what kind of role the state should play as the embodiment and proponent of nationalist values, and what foreign forces pose a threat to the nation’s survival and values so serious that they require a collective response.

–Second, consistent with a central theoretical point, U.S. nationalism is not fixed but rather has evolved. It has arguably gone through three stages over the last two and half centuries. The most recent ran from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1960s and was organized around and promoted by a modernizing, burgeoning American state. This state-dominated nationalism came to accept and even advance an expanded understanding of citizenship (overcoming previous racial and gender barriers). And it was fixated on and galvanized by a string of international dangers beginning with the Kaiser’s Germany and Bolshevism, continuing with Hitler’s Germany and Tojo’s Japan, and concluding in its heyday with a communist monolith that gave way to distinct Soviet and Chinese threats.

–Finally, U.S. nationalism, again true to the general pattern, has never been static. What it means to be an American has always been contested — and quite intensely so at those points of transition from one phase of nationalist faith to another. We arguably find ourselves today at one of those points of transition with the old state-centered nationalism losing its grip.

Our current transition is in part the result of the demise of the world of empire and interstate conflict in which state-centered nationalism took shape. Today’s globalized world poses different challenges and imposes different constraints. The transition is also a result of a striking changes in U.S. society since the 1960s. The most important may be the rise of a consumer regime that has thoroughly reshaped the basic outlook as well as daily activities of most Americans (a development adroitly sketched by Emily Rosenberg in the Bacevich volume). But there are other contenders for the loyalty of Americans including the free-market religion so assiduously promoted over the last three or four decades not to mention a resuscitated version of the old statist faith along the lines articulated by Lieber.

Only when some alternative view speaks in a clear and broadly appealing way about the nature of citizenship, the role of the state, and the identity of the “dangerous other” will the country be able to move on to a new, fourth stage of nationalism, and only then will U.S. leaders gain the policy compass they so badly need. When and how this transition might occur no one can confidently predict. Even more difficult to anticipate is what impact a new nationalism might have on U.S. hegemony — whether to breathe new life into it or to intensify its problems.

This is only a sketch of the contours of U.S. nationalism as I think it applies to the current hegemonic disarray. Readers wanting more detail can turn to my December 2012 Krasno lecture (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyfGhPXTBfw). An even fuller treatment should in time appear in a book tentatively (and perhaps immodestly) titled “Bridging the Gap: Academic History and the Future of U.S. Foreign Relations.”

The new foreign policy consensus: A word of caution

Over the several years American leaders and the public have been edging toward a new consensus. They have had enough of the international sturm und drang that has prevailed since 9/11 and seem resolved on concentrating on a daunting collection of domestic ills. Not least among these are lagging growth rates, rising inequalities, and swelling deficits. The recent presidential election seems to have validated the consensus. Domestic issues dominated; foreign affairs stayed in the shadows. The accelerated timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan was received with a shrug. The Benghazi controversy failed to gain traction with the electorate.

The new consensus has been confirmed since Obama’s victory. His inaugural address announced the end of a decade of war and the start of a process of national reinvention meant to address challenges on the home front. References to maintaining U.S. military power, preserving alliances, and advancing global democracy and development were distinctly pro forma. Secretary of State nominee John Kerry in his opening statement before the Senate Foreign Relations committee played the new line pitch perfect. He stressed the priority of getting the U.S. fiscal house in order and more generally handling the national business in a more efficient and timely fashion.

However sensible this new consensus may be, it suffers from a major flaw: its profound vulnerability. There are at least three directions from which threats may arise.

One is the continuing, sweeping U.S. commitment to global leadership. Can the Obama administration and the political class more generally stand aside when crises erupt in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, or East Asia? So far so good on Syria and Mali and Somalia and Yemen. But in none of these has the conflict fully played out. And who can predict what other trouble spots may yet “demand” U.S. engagement? This cautionary point is supported by striking cases of presidents whose domestic agendas were derailed by unanticipated events abroad. Think of Woodrow Wilson and World War I, Franklin Roosevelt and wars in Europe and the Asia, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam, Jimmy Carter and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

A second threat is the ongoing confrontations with regional powers in which too much politically and ideologically has been invested to be called off. Iran and North Korea are acute concerns. Add to the list China, which has become the target of the Obama administration’s much heralded pivot toward Asia, as well as Putin’s Russia with its prickly relationship with the United States. The U.S. notion of global leadership has over the last half century expressed itself above all else in terms of repeated and widespread regional interventions. The new consensus assumes what is palpably untrue — that the American leaders will retreat — or will be allowed to retreat — when regional challenges arise.

If international chance or regional circumstance don’t disrupt the new consensus, then political frustration may do the job. It is easy to imagine domestic renovation miscarrying or at least bogging down as a result of the deep divisions over how precisely to address an accumulation of ills. At what point do political forces at loggerheads step away from seemingly insoluble problems at home in favor of foreign issues, especially where the vaunted U.S. military superiority can be put to work? Presidents have a long track record of absorbing themselves in foreign policy where they enjoy latitude after finding their hands tied on the domestic front. How much more satisfying to play commander-in-chief than pleader-and-negotiator-in-chief operating in a noisy, crowded domestic arena. Conservatives frustrated by the growth of government programs have their own reason to champion overseas adventures. Better the energies of the American state be directed safely abroad and away from domestic aggrandizement. The neo-conservatives who championed and then helped direct the Iraq invasion acted on precisely this conviction.

The new consensus makes sense. The country suffers from real problems that deserve urgent attention. But those championing the new restraint should realize they are hostages not just to events abroad but also to their own deeply ingrained commitment to a broad, ill-defined, and highly militarized version of global leadership.

U.S. nationalisms and the world: Thinking about a country in disarray (video)

I recently offered some reflections on U.S. nationalism. This 4 December talk was part of a series of Krasno lectures at UNC organized by Professor Klaus Larres.


As indicated in my introductory remarks on the video, this talk draws from my current book project dealing with the gap between history as conceived in the foreign policy establishment and history as practiced in the academy. I am worried that the gap is large but also convinced that the rewards of closing it are substantial. Most of the video is devoted to outlining one facet of the project, an interpretation of U.S. nationalism that pulls together current scholarship in a way that speaks to current foreign policy and national politics. Some may recognize in my comments themes sounded in posts on this site. The video concludes with a thoughtful set of questions posed by the audience.

The American project in the Middle East: The end is nigh!

If you think the past week or so has not gone well for Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, then what to say about the U.S. position in the Middle East? Washington’s attempt to remake or at least manage the region has suffered a string of blows that suggests the end is nigh.

Dreams of transforming the region look wildly implausible today. Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader who has consolidated his control as president of Egypt, launched one straw into the wind. He was unabashed in telling a New York Times reporter that Americans had to get used to a multicultural world. “If you want to judge the performance of the Egyptian people by the standards of German or Chinese or American culture, then there is no room for judgment.” Islamic values in one way or another now seem bound to define his country’s politics as much as they do everyday life. On another front, Afghan women made their own point about cultural persistence. A survey released by the Population Reference Bureau reveals they have no problem with gender relations that American policymakers have denounced as oppressive and have sought to alter through aid programs.

Pro-U.S. regimes, variously clients or partners, have become increasingly troublesome. Egypt is kicking off the old traces with President Morsi suggesting that good relations with Israel depends on Washington delivering on the other part of the 1978 Camp David accord, the creation of a Palestinian state. A couple of billion dollars in annual aid no longer seems to purchase a blind eye in Cairo to what has proven a one-sided peace deal.

Iraq is paying no dividends on the costly U.S. investment there. Washington has failed to shape the government in Baghdad to its preferences, to maintain a residual U.S. military force, or to sustain any significant U.S. training mission. All these critical means of exercising post-occupation influence have closed off. Meanwhile the Nouri al-Maliki government is uncooperative on the two issues of current American concern, the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the containment of Iran.

In Afghanistan the military mission seems to have reached its own dead end. Hostility to NATO trainers has undercut the one remaining contribution that the U.S. policymakers could have made to the survival of its feeble Kabul client. Where to go from here but to the exit?

Israel is now a loose cannon, well beyond U.S. influence. The declining U.S. position in the region means Washington has little to offer to secure the cooperation of the Netanyahu government. Why should that government defer to an Obama administration that can’t deliver Turkey, Egypt, or Iraq and is reconciled to Iran becoming a latent nuclear power? Indeed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has turned the tables by overtly seeking to influence the U.S. presidential election. While the tail attempts to wag the dog, the Israeli lobby controls the bounds of legitimate discussion of this troubled relationship so that the dog develops no heretical ideas.

More broadly, a bevy of powers has made it their business to obstruct and disrupt U.S. influence. The regional powers dubious about the American role now include Turkey, Egypt, and Iran. China and Russia have joined the scrum, eager to constrain the United States where they can. And now the leading states of the European Union, long ambivalent about U.S. activity on their Mediterranean doorstep, are once again considering measures to achieve a unified foreign policy. The EU could over the long haul give U.S. policymakers the biggest international headache of all.

The American public has steadily lost its appetite for further meddling — an unsurprising trend given all that has transpired over the last decade. Most Americans say they want nothing to do with an Israeli-Iranian war that some friends of Israel so blithely contemplate. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were quite enough, thank you. The election year message on those two interventions seems loud and clear: “just go away.”

For those who like to take the long view, the pattern we’re seeing here looks for all the world like an imperial project grinding toward its inglorious end. This is a point made in comments here previously and in the recently published Arc of Empire (co-authored with Steven I. Levine). But seldom does the moment of critical transition come so clearly into focus as it has lately. Day after day the news points to a great power on the defensive. Its Middle East dreams have gone sour, its good will in the region has dwindled, its international support has narrowed, its clients have strayed, its domestic backing has evaporated, and its tools of control have proven largely irrelevant and even counterproductive. The end feels pretty nigh!

Ryan Crocker and the Imperial Reckoning

Outgoing Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s interview with the New York Times earlier this week served notice that a controversial American project is drawing to a close. Crocker has been intimately involved from the beginning. He served in the State Department during the run up to the Iraq invasion and warned in a co-authored memo titled “The Perfect Storm” of the dangers of Iraq fragmenting and becoming a focus of regional conflict. He later became ambassador to Iraq before his posting to Afghanistan.

His impending departure from Kabul has put him a retrospective mood. He offers as lessons worth learning from the Iraq-Afghanistan adventure that U.S. control is limited, especially when meddling in other peoples’ lives and lands, and that liquidating an intervention gone bad is difficult.

Crocker’s comments are more interesting for their omissions than for their self-evident insights. He could say, for example, that he has been involved in a great imperial failure deserving of careful study.

It’s imperial in the sense that the Bush administration took over two countries by force of arms and along with the Obama administration tried to reshape them to U.S. preferences through a combination of direct rule and client regimes. This exercise would in the case of any other country be called empire. So let’s not be squeamish; for the sake of clarity, let’s do it here.

It’s a failure in the sense that the goals that defined the project at the outset have not been met, and even the watered down objectives seem well beyond reach. The destruction and dislocation on the ground has been considerable, indeed a humanitarian disaster. The expenditure of U.S. resources at a time of mounting fiscal constraint has been foolishly profligate. The Middle East may be less responsive to U.S. interests and the international community less attuned to U.S. legitimacy and leadership than at any time since the end of World War II.

The magnitude of that failure becomes evident if viewed in comparative terms. The United States has carved out positions overseas that can fairly be called imperial dating back to the seizure, occupation, and pacification of the Philippines in 1898-99. Cuba, Haiti, Guatemala, Iran, South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam were some of the other countries that came under and then slipped out of U.S. control. Yet arguably in none of these cases — with one glaring exception — did the outcome fall so short of U.S. goals and prove so damaging to U.S. interests.

That exception was of course Vietnam, which Crocker does not even allude to even though his foreign service career began there just as the U.S. war there was drawing to its dismal end. He might well have said that taking over Iraq and Afghanistan flew in the face of lessons that Vietnam should already have taught. But serious Vietnam lessons — those that are well grounded historically — remain radioactive. Political leaders and the foreign policy establishment don’t want to get close. They have many ambitions but glowing in the dark seems not one of them.

One reason for the U.S. failure in the Middle East seems obvious. The Bush administration embraced empire long after empire’s expiration date had passed. The American project faced potent opposition in Iraq and Afghanistan that could be contained only by making deals with shrewd collaborators with their own interests to serve. The international hostility to the Iraq invasion was intense, and even in the United States the Iraq adventure fell into disfavor. In domestic and international opinion Afghanistan has fared only slightly better. In short empire has become anathema. It is so disagreeable a phenomenon that even the American policymakers who practice it can not bring themselves to call it by its proper name.

Thus Crocker’s interview provides a reminder that the time for lessons, stocktaking, judgments, and even recrimination, scapegoating, and shirking responsibility have arrived. For any historian, this marks the beginning of a familiar process following a fairly standard script. We have already largely gotten through the first stage — the appearance of journalist accounts written from the perspective of Washington and the troops in the field. These first cut histories are usually followed by participant memoirs in which decision makers and their servitors like Crocker can offer up their own usually self-serving versions of events. The third stage opens as the relevant government documents and personal papers see the light of day. Policy wonks and history geeks have a field day as the National Archives and presidential libraries open for research the fundamental stuff of good history — ample, detailed evidence. (At this point the original of Crocker’s memo should appear and scholars will determine whether it lives up to its reputation.)

The resulting richly documented reconstructions may improve on the journalist and memoir accounts, but they won’t provide the last word or yield a consensus. Indeed, perspectives are bound to continue to change depending especially on developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and their neighborhood. Perspectives are also bound to get richer as scholars explore the international perspective, including regional views. This entire process is agonizingly slow. Declassification of government documents usually doesn’t happen until thirty years or more after the event. (Some important material related to intelligence and covert activities may never be released.) So sadly as time passes and the basis for judgment grows richer, the interest in it outside fairly narrow communities of specialists fades as new issues rivet public and policy attention.

Finally, Crocker’s diplomatic swan song raises difficult professional and moral questions about how to respond when implicated in a policy deeply damaging to the U.S. international position, blatantly in violation of professed U.S. values and international norms, resulting in death and destruction to millions, and directing yet another generation of young Americans through the meat grinder of a misbegotten war. Resign quietly? Protest publicly knowing little will come of it? Serve on in hopes of somehow preventing a bad course of action from getting worse? Honor an earlier commitment of service to the American state — or to be more precise the imperial presidency? Crocker and others in the foreign service and the military will no doubt tell us more about how they wrestled with these options or simply passed them by with little thought to anything beyond the obligation to follow orders. Imperial reckonings are also, it seems, a time for personal reckonings.

Panetta on tour in an Asia without history

Last week Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta completed an inspection tour of the Asia. Like any respectable tourist, he should have shown some interest in the lands on his itinerary. The proclaimed Obama administration pivot toward the region provided all the more reason for a careful look at Asia’s path to the present. Over the last century the region has gone through an extraordinary transformation in which colonialism, revolution, warfare, authoritarian and communist leaders, and state-guided economic development have all played a part. The U.S. involvement has been deep, varied and highly consequential. In four wars beginning in the Philippines in 1899, Americans have practiced counter-insurgency, cultivated allies and confronted enemies, secured a network of military bases, perfected the art of annihilating cities from the air, offered up its consumer market as an export prize, and in general experienced triumph as well as frustration.

Panetta’s formal comments and casual remarks reveal little interest in this rich past, no insights that would be instructive, and some generalizations that are distinctly misleading if not wrongheaded.

  • The commencement address he delivered at the U.S. Naval Academy on 29 May on the eve of the trip anticipated the cavalier handling of history to come. The United States was, he informed the midshipmen, “returning to our maritime roots” and taking care of “historic” alliances” in the region. But nothing to clarify these claims or their relevance to the “China challenge” preoccupying the Obama administration.
  • Two days later during a stopover in Hawaii, he informed assembled troops that “we learned a lot of lessons” from the Vietnam War. But he offered none that were policy relevant. Indeed, the only lesson he served up was “support our troops” — and this without saying who had failed them during the Vietnam conflict and how.
  • Talking the next day with reporters , Panetta stressed the importance of building trust with China but gave nary a thought to how Chinese leaders had reacted to earlier U.S. military expansion and whether lots of meetings and expressions of U.S. good intentions were (as Panetta seemed to assume) enough to create confidence in Beijing.
  • In the major address of the tour, delivered in Singapore on 2 June, Panetta opened and closed by genuflecting to Clio. He recalled the U.S. turn to the Pacific during the era of continental expansion and his own memory of the fear that gripped his coastal California community during war with Japan and later in Korea. “Over the course of history,” he noted glibly at the end, “the United States has fought wars, we have spilled blood, we have deployed our forces time and time again to defend our vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region.” But these gestures to the historical muse went nowhere.

His one attempt at a grand historical observation led to trouble. He claimed that U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic presence in Asia had “helped usher in an unprecedented era of security and prosperity in the latter half of the 20th century.” Exactly the opposite would be closer to the truth. The U.S. presence had spawned conflict and U.S. military might had sown destruction between 1899 and 1975. Richard Nixon’s decision to retreat from Asia marked the end of a long, bloody drive into the region. He brought the Vietnam War to an end, recognized China as regional power with which the United States would have to do business, and swore to avoid involvement in more Asian wars. This retreat may have been the most important U.S. contribution to the period of peace and development that followed.

  • Panetta’s last set of comments came on 3 June in remarks to U.S. Navy personnel in Cam Ranh Bay, a major U.S. logistical base during the Vietnam War. Panetta tantalizingly pointed to “the great arc of history that we’re all part of.” But predictably nothing on the bend of the arc and its larger significance.

Under the circumstances he did have to say something about Vietnam’s place in the arc. “A tremendous amount of blood was spilled here on all sides, on the American side and on the Vietnamese side.” But what sense to make of “the sacrifice of all those who fought and many of whom who died in that war”? Panetta grasped the happy thought that the terrible costs would be justified “if we can build a better future.” (He seemed to like this formulation because he used it again in even more convoluted form in remarks to a group of reporters: “If we can work together, both of our countries, to develop a better relationship between the United States and Vietnam, all of the sacrifice involved in that war will have proven worthwhile because we will improve the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.”) Panetta’s anodyne approach suggests he cannot see (or will not see) that the Vietnam War was the result of contending differences — Vietnamese and American — over the future each wanted for that country and that the defeat of U.S. forces and their Saigon ally finally resolved the issue. Sacrifice in this case had not built a better future; it had been the by-product of a violent dispute over who got to define that future. Americans and Vietnamese emerged from that war with a heavy burden that made a better world harder, not easier, to achieve.

Panetta’s weak sense of the past is revealing at several levels. Here is a self described member of the Vietnam generation who has witnessed first hand the trauma of that war and its legacy of division and distrust. Perhaps even more significant, he has a sterling establishment reputation After serving an apprenticeship in the House of Representatives, he moved over to the executive side, first in Bill Clinton’s White House and more recently under Barack Obama as head of the CIA and now Department of Defense. Yet despite a generational stake in Asia and considerable policy experience, this consummate Washington insider can bring to the official table nothing more than a shallow and unsophisticated understanding of the policy-relevant past.

There is good reason to conclude based on comments by the president and others in the administration, that Panetta’s limits are those of an entire administration and arguably even the broader Washington policy community. Ultimately history seems irrelevant except as rhetorical dressing or plausible talking points.

Tourists can ignore history without harm. Policymaker who do so are rendered clueless and forced to operate in something close to an eternal present. Worst of all, policymakers floating free of the past can talk in grandiose and self-flattering terms about bringing peace, stability, security, and prosperity to an entire region while ignoring the difficult questions history poses.

  • What exactly is the point of the U.S. pivot toward Asia and what risks does it entail? If the previous U.S. involvement that began in the Philippines and culminated in Vietnam generated repeated rounds of conflict, what are the reasons for thinking things will go more smoothly this time?
  • If countries within the region resisted in varying degrees the first U.S. intrusion, why expect cooperation or acquiescence this time? How will those countries with their own immediate stakes and with still lively memories of an earlier era of conflict involving the United States respond to the prospect of Americans pivoting back to prominence? (The meeting between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Hu Jintao right on the heels of the Panetta tour underline the pertinence of that question.) Are American leaders, who once underestimated Asian nationalism, about to repeat that mistake?
  • What commitments and unforeseen consequences might follow from deepening U.S. engagement? Can the U.S. treasury now sustain the costs? Will today’s public prove any more patient with commitments gone awry than in the past?

An administration without a serious sense of history has simply finessed these questions when it should be wrestling with them — and sharing their answers with the rest of us.